In its classical form, a consistent replicated service requires all replicas to witness the same evolution of the service state. If we consider an asynchronous messagepassing environment in which processes might fail by crashing, and assume that a majority of processes are correct, then the necessary and sufficient information about failures for implementing a general state machine replication scheme ensuring consistency is captured by the Ω failure detector. This paper shows that in such a message-passing environment, Ω is also the weakest failure detector to implement an eventually consistent replicated service, where replicas are expected to agree on the evolution of the service state only after some (a priori unknown) time. In fact, we show that Ω is the weakest to implement eventual consistency in any A previous version of this work appears in the proceedings of the 2015 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing [13] . P. Kuznetsov:The research leading to these results has received funding from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche, under Grant Agreement ANR-14-CE35-0010-01, project DISCMAT. Télécom ParisTech, Paris, France message-passing environment, i.e., under any assumption on when and where failures might occur. Ensuring (strong) consistency in any environment requires, in addition to Ω, the quorum failure detector Σ. Our paper thus captures, for the first time, an exact computational difference between building a replicated state machine that ensures consistency and one that only ensures eventual consistency.
Introduction
State machine replication [24, 29] is the most studied technique to build a highly-available and consistent distributed service. The idea consists in replicating the service, modeled as a state machine, over several processes and ensuring that all replicas behave like one correct and available state machine, despite concurrent invocations of operations and crash failures of replicas. This is typically captured using the abstraction of total order broadcast [9, 20] , where messages represent invocations of the service operations from clients to replicas. Assuming that the state machine is deterministic, delivering the invocations in the same total order ensures that the replicas behave like a single state machine. Total order broadcast is, in turn, typically implemented by having the processes agree on which message (or a batch of messages) to execute next, using the consensus abstraction [5, 25] . The two abstractions, consensus and total order broadcast, were shown to be equivalent in [5] .
Replicas behaving like a single one is a property generally called consistency. The purpose of the abstractions underlying the state machine replication scheme, namely consensus and total order broadcast, is precisely to ensure this consis-tency, while providing at the same time availability, namely that the replicated service does not stop responding. The inherent costs of these abstractions are sometimes considered too high, both in terms of the necessary computability assumptions about the underlying system [1, 4, 15] , and the number of communication steps needed to deliver an invocation [25, 26] .
An appealing approach to circumvent these costs is to trade consistency with what is sometimes called eventual consistency [28, 33] : namely to give up the requirement that the replicas always look the same, and replace it with the requirement that they only look the same eventually, i.e., after a finite but not a priori bounded period of time. Basically, eventual consistency says that the replicas can diverge for some period, as long as this period is finite.
Many systems claim to implement general state machines that ensure eventual consistency in message-passing systems, e.g., Cassandra [23] and Dynamo [10] . But, to our knowledge, there has been no theoretical study of the exact assumptions on the information about failures underlying those implementations. This paper is the first to do so: using the formalism of failure detectors [4, 5] , it addresses the question of the minimal information about failures needed to implement an eventually consistent replicated state machine.
It has been shown in [4] that, in a message-passing environment with a majority of correct processes, the weakest failure detector to implement consensus (and, thus, total order broadcast [7, 9] ) is the eventual leader failure detector, denoted Ω. In short, Ω outputs, at every process and at all times, a leader process so that, eventually, the same correct process is considered leader by all. Ω can thus be viewed as the weakest failure detector to implement a generic replicated state machine ensuring consistency (and availability) in an environment with a majority of correct processes.
We show in this paper that, surprisingly, the weakest failure detector to implement an eventually consistent replicated service in this environment (in fact, in any environment) is still Ω. We prove our result via an interesting generalization of the celebrated "CHT proof" by Chandra, Hadzilacos and Toueg [4] . In the CHT proof, every process periodically extracts the identifier of a process that is expected to be correct (the leader) from the valencies of an evergrowing collection of locally simulated runs. We carefully adjust the notion of valency to apply this approach to the weaker abstraction of eventual repeated consensus, which we show to be necessary and sufficient to implement eventual consistency.
Our result becomes less surprising if we realize that a correct majority prevents the system from being partitioned, and we know that both consistency and availability cannot be achieved while tolerating partitions [1, 11, 17] . Therefore, in a system with a correct majority of processes, weakening consistency does not allow for a weaker failure detector:
(strong) consistency requires the same information about failures as eventual one. In an arbitrary environment, however, i.e., under any assumptions on when and where failures may occur, the weakest failure detector for consistency is known to be Ω + Σ, where Σ [11] returns a set of processes (called a quorum) so that every two such quorums intersect at any time and there is a time after which all returned quorums contain only correct processes. We show in this paper that ensuring eventual consistency does not require Σ: only Ω is needed, even if we do not assume a majority of correct processes. Therefore, Σ represents the exact difference between consistency and eventual consistency. Our result thus theoretically backs up partition-tolerance [1, 17] as one of the main motivations behind the very notion of eventual consistency.
We establish our results through the following steps:
-We give precise definitions of the notions of eventual repeated consensus and eventual total order broadcast. We show that the two abstractions are equivalent. These underlie the intuitive notion of eventual consistency implemented in many replicated services [6, 8, 10 ]. -We show how to extend the celebrated CHT proof [4] , initially establishing that Ω is necessary for solving consensus, to the context of eventual repeated consensus. Through this extension, we indirectly highlight a hidden power of the technique proposed in [4] that somehow provides more than was used in the original CHT proof. -We present an algorithm that uses Ω to implement, in any message-passing environment, an eventually consistent replicated service. The algorithm features three interesting properties:
(1) An invocation can be performed after the optimal number of two communication steps, even if a majority of processes is not correct and even during periods when processes disagree on the leader, i.e., partition periods; 1 (2) If Ω outputs the same leader at all processes from the very beginning, then the algorithm implements total order broadcast and hence ensures consistency; (3) Causal ordering is ensured even during periods where Ω outputs different leaders at different processes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present our system model and basic definitions in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, we introduce abstractions for implementing eventual consistency: namely, eventual repeated consensus and eventual total order broadcast, and we prove them to be equivalent. We show in Sect. 4 that the weakest failure detector for eventual repeated consensus in any message-passing environment is Ω. We present in Sect. 5 our algorithm that implements eventual total order broadcast using Ω in any environment. Section 6 discusses related work, and Sect. 7 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
We adopt the classical model of distributed systems provided with the failure detector abstraction proposed in [4, 5] . In particular we employ the simplified version of the model proposed in [18, 21] .
We consider a message-passing system with a set of processes Π = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n } (n ≥ 2). Processes execute steps of computation asynchronously, i.e., there is no bound on the delay between steps. However, we assume a discrete global clock to which the processes do not have access. The range of this clock's ticks is N. Each pair of processes are connected by a reliable link.
Processes may fail by crashing. A failure pattern is a function F : N → 2 Π , where F(t) is the set of processes that have crashed by time t. We assume that processes never recover from crashes, i.e., F(t) ⊆ F(t + 1). Let faulty(F) = t∈N F(t) be the set of faulty processes in a failure pattern F, and correct(F) = Π − faulty(F) be the set of correct processes in F. An environment, denoted E, is a set of failure patterns.
A failure detector history H with range R is a function H : Π × N → R, where H ( p, t) is interpreted as the value output by the failure detector module of process p at time t. A failure detector D with range R is a function that maps every failure pattern F to a nonempty set of failure detector histories. D(F) denotes the set of all possible failure detector histories that may be output by D in a failure pattern F.
For example, at each process, the leader failure detector Ω outputs the id of a process; furthermore, if a correct process exists, then there is a time after which Ω outputs the id of the same correct process at every correct process. Another example is the quorum failure detector Σ, which outputs a set of processes at each process. Any two sets output at any times and by any processes intersect, and eventually every set output at any correct process consists of only correct processes.
An algorithm A is modeled as a collection of n deterministic automata, where A( p) specifies the behavior of process p. Computation proceeds in steps of these automata. In each step, identified as a tuple ( p, m, d, A), a process p atomically (1) receives a single message m (that can be the empty message λ) or accepts an input (from the external world), (2) queries its local failure detector module and receives a value d, (3) changes its state according to A( p), and (4) sends a message specified by A( p) for the new state to every process or produces an output (to the external world). Note that the use of λ ensures that a step of a process is always enabled, even if no message is sent to it.
A configuration of an algorithm A specifies the local state of each process and the set of messages in transit. In the initial configuration of A, no message is in transit and each process p is in the initial state of the automaton A( p). A schedule S of A is a finite or infinite sequence of steps of A that respects A( p) for each p.
Inputs and outputs of processes are modeled via input histories H I and output histories H O that specify the sequences of inputs each process receives from its application and the sequences of outputs each process returns to the application over time: At each time t and for every process p i , t) ) denotes the input (resp., the output) received by p i (resp., produced by p i ) at time t, which can be a distinct value ⊥ in case no input (resp., output) occurs. Typically, inputs and outputs represent invocations and responses of operations exported by the implemented abstraction.
A run of algorithm A using failure detector 
If there is an algorithm that solves P using D, we sometimes, with a slight language abuse, say that D implements P.
Consider two problems P and P . A transformation from P to P in an environment E [20] is a map T P→P that, given any algorithm A P solving P in E, yields an algorithm A P solving P in E. The transformation is asynchronous in the sense that A P is used as a "black box" where A P is obtained by feeding inputs to A P and using the returned outputs to solve P . Hence, if P is solvable in E using a failure detector D, the existence of a transformation T P→P in E establishes that P is also solvable in E using D. If, additionally, there exists a transformation from P to P in E, we say that P and P are equivalent in E.
Failure detectors can be partially ordered based on their "power": failure detector D is weaker than failure detector D in E if there is an algorithm that emulates the output of D using D in E [4, 21] . If D is weaker than D , any problem that can be solved with D can also be solved with D . For a problem P, D * is the weakest failure detector to solve P in E if (a) there is an algorithm that uses D * to solve P in E, and (b) D * is weaker than any failure detector D that can be used to solve P in E.
Abstractions for eventual consistency
We define two basic abstractions that capture the notion of eventual consistency: eventual total order broadcast and eventual repeated consensus. We show that the two abstractions are equivalent: each of them can be used to implement the other.
Eventual total order broadcast (ETOB)
The total order broadcast (TOB) abstraction [9, 20] 
To match out formalism of input and output histories, we interprete a call of broadcastTOB(m) that took place at time t as an event in the input history H I , and each change in the value of d i that takes place at time t, i.e.,
as an event in the output history H O .
Assuming that broadcast messages are distinct, the TOB abstraction satisfies:
TOB-Validity If a correct process p i broadcasts a message m at time t, then p i eventually stably delivers m, i.e., ∀t ≥ t : 
TOB-Total-order Let p i and p j be any two correct processes such that two messages m 1 and
We then introduce the eventual total order broadcast (ETOB) abstraction, which maintains the same inputs and outputs as TOB (messages are broadcast by a call to broadcastETOB(m)) and satisfies, in every admissible run, the TOB-Validity, TOB-No-creation, TOB-No-duplication, and TOBAgreement properties, plus the following relaxed properties for some τ ∈ N:
ETOB-Stability For any correct process 
in d j (t).
As we show in this paper, satisfying the following optional (but useful) property in ETOB does not require more information about failures. 
TOB-Causal-Order

Eventual repeated consensus (ERC)
The consensus abstraction (C) [15] exports, to every process p i , a single operation proposeC that takes a binary argument and returns a binary response (we also say decides) so that the following properties are satisfied:
C-Termination Every correct process eventually returns a response to proposeC. C-Integrity Every process returns a response at most once.
C-Agreement No two processes return different values.
C-Validity Every value returned was previously proposed.
The eventual repeated consensus (ERC) abstraction exports, to every process p i , operations proposeERC 1 , proposeERC 2 , . . . that take binary arguments and return binary responses. Assuming that, for all = 1, 2, . . ., every process, as soon as it returns a response to proposeERC , invokes proposeERC +1 or crashes, the abstraction guarantees that, for every admissible run, there exists k ∈ N, such that the following properties are satisfied:
ERC-Termination Every correct process eventually returns a response to proposeERC , for all ∈ N.
ERC-Integrity
No process responds twice to propose ERC , for all ∈ N.
ERC-Validity
Every value returned to proposeERC was previously proposed to proposeERC , for all ∈ N.
ERC-Agreement No two processes return different values
to proposeERC , for all ≥ k.
It is straightforward to transform the binary version of ERC into a multivalued one with unbounded set of inputs [27] . In the following, except for the necessity proof in Sect. 4, when we discuss an ERC algorithm, we mean a multivalued version of it.
Equivalence between ERC and ETOB
It is well known that, in their classical forms, the consensus and the total order broadcast abstractions are equivalent [5] .
In this section, we show that a similar result holds for our eventual versions of these abstractions. The intuition behind the transformation from ERC to ETOB is the following. Each time a process p i wants to ETOB-broadcast a message m, p sends m to each process. Periodically, every process p i proposes its current sequence of messages received so far to ERC. This sequence is built by concatenating the last output of ERC(stored in a local variable d i ) to the batch of all messages received by the process and not yet present in d i . The output of ERC is stored in d i , i.e., at any time, each process delivers the last sequence of messages returned by ERC.
The correctness of this transformation follows from the fact that ERC eventually returns consistent responses to the processes. Thus, eventually, all processes agree on the same linearly growing sequence of stably delivered messages. Furthermore, every message broadcast by a correct process eventually appears either in the delivered message sequence or in the batches of not yet delivered messages at all correct processes. Thus, by ERC-Validity of ERC, every message ETOB-broadcast by a correct process is eventually stored in d i of every correct process p i forever. By construction, no message appears in d i twice or if it was not previously ETOB-broadcast. Therefore, the transformation satisfies the properties of ETOB.
The transformation from ETOB to ERC is as follows. At each invocation of the ERC primitive, the process broadcasts a message using the ETOB abstraction. This message contains the proposed value and the index of the consensus instance. As soon as a message corresponding to a given eventual repeated consensus instance is delivered by process p i (appears in d i ), p i returns the value contained in the message.
Since the ETOB abstraction guarantees that every process eventually stably delivers the same sequence of messages, there exists a consensus instance after which the responses of the transformation to all alive processes are identical. Moreover, by ETOB-Validity, every message ETOB-broadcast by a correct process p i is eventually stably delivered. Thus, every correct process eventually returns from any ERCinstance it invokes. Thus, the transformation satisfies the ERC specification.
Theorem 1 In any environment E, ERC and ETOB are equivalent.
Proof We prove this result by providing two algorithms, one implementing ERC from ETOB and the other implementing ETOB from ERC. From ERC to ETOB. To prove this result, it is sufficient to provide a protocol that implements ETOB in an environment E knowing that there exists a protocol that implements ERC in this environment. This transformation protocol T ERC→ETOB is stated in Algorithm 1. Now, we are going to prove that T ERC→ETOB implements ETOB.
Assume that there exists a message m broadcast by a correct process p i at time t. As p i is correct, every correct process receives the message push(m) in a finite time. Then, m appears in the set toDeliver of all correct processes in a finite time. Hence, by the termination property of ERC and the construction of the function NewBatch, there exists such that m is included in any sequence submitted to proposeERC . By the ERC-Validity and the ERC-Termination properties, we deduce that p i stably delivers m in a finite time, which proves that T ERC→ETOB satisfies the TOB-Validity property.
If a process p i delivers a message m at time t, then m appears in the sequence responded by its last invocation of proposeERC . By construction and by the ERC-Validity property, this sequence contains only messages that appear in the set toDeliver of a process p j at the time p j invokes proposeERC . But the toDeliver set contains only previously messages broadcast. Therefore, T ERC→ETOB satisfies the TOB-No-creation.
As the sequence output at any time by any process is the response to its last invocation of proposeERC and as the sequence submitted to any invocation of this primitive contains no duplicated message (by definition of the function NewBatch), we can deduce from the ERC-Validity property that T ERC→ETOB satisfies the TOB-No-duplication.
Assume that a correct process p i stably delivers a message m, i.e., there exists a time after which m always appears in d i . By the algorithm, m always appears in the response of proposeERC to p i after this time. As the ERC-Agreement property is eventually satisfied, we can deduce that m always appears in the response of proposeERC for any correct process after some time. Thus, any correct process stably delivers m, and T ERC→ETOB satisfies the TOB-Agreement.
Let τ be the time after which the ERC primitive satisfies ERC-Agreement and ERC-Validity.
Let p i be a correct process and τ ≤ t 1 ≤ t 2 . Let 1 (respectively 2 ) be the integer such that d i (t 1 ) (respectively d i (t 2 )) is the response of proposeERC 1 (respectively proposeERC 2 ). By construction of the protocol and the ERC-Agreement and ERC-Validity properties, we know that, after time τ , the response of proposeERC to correct processes is a prefix of the response of proposeERC +1 . As we have 1 ≤ 2 , we can deduce that T ERC→ETOB satisfies the ETOB-Stability property.
Let p i and p j be two correct processes such that two messages m 1 and m 2 appear in d i (t) and d j (t) at time t ≥ τ . Let be the smallest integer such that m 1 and m 2 appear in the response of proposeERC . By the ERC-Agreement property, we know that the response of proposeERC is identical for all correct processes. Then, by the ETOB-Stability property proved above, that implies that, if m 1 appears before m 2 in d i (t), then m 1 appears before m 2 in d j (t). In other words, T ERC→ETOB satisfies the ETOB-Total-order property.
In conclusion, T ERC→ETOB satisfies the ETOB specification in an environment E provided that there exists a protocol that implements ERC in this environment. From ETOB to ERC. To prove this result, it is sufficient to provide a protocol that implements ERC in an environment E given a protocol that implements ETOB in this environment. This transformation protocol T ETOB→ERC is stated in Algorithm 2. Now, we are going to prove that T ETOB→ERC implements ERC.
Let p i be a correct process that invokes proposeERC (v) with ∈ N. Then, by fairness and the TOB-Validity property, the construction of the protocol implies that the ETOB primitive delivers the message ( , v) to p i in a finite time. By the use of the local timeout, we know that p i returns from proposeERC (v) in a finite time, which proves that T ETOB→ERC satisfies the ERC-Termination property.
The update of the variable count i to for any process p i that invokes proposeERC and the assumptions on operations proposeERC ensure us that p i executes at most once the function DecideEC(count i , First ( count i )) . Hence, T ETOB→ERC satisfies the ERC-Integrity property.
Let τ be the time after which the ETOB-Stability and the ETOB-Total-order properties are satisfied. Let k be the small- 
Every value returned by proposeERC at a process p i comes from d i , and d i may only contain ETOB outputs, which, by the TOB-No-creation property, have been previously proposed. Thus, T ETOB→ERC satisfies the ERCValidity property.
In conclusion, T ETOB→ERC satisfies the ERC specification in an environment E provided that there exists a protocol that implements ETOB in this environment.
The weakest failure detector for ERC
In this section, we show that Ω is necessary and sufficient for implementing the eventual repeated consensus abstraction ERC:
Theorem 2 In any environment E, Ω is the weakest failure detector for ERC.
Ω is necessary for ERC
Let E be any environment. We show below that Ω is weaker than any failure detector D that can be used to solve ERC in E. Recall that implementing Ω means outputting, at every process, the identifier of a leader process so that eventually, the same correct leader is output permanently at all correct processes.
A very brief CHT primer. First, we briefly recall the arguments used by Chandra et al. [4] in the original proof (known as the CHT proof ) that Ω can be derived from any algorithm solving consensus. To get a more detailed survey of the proof please refer to [16, Chapter 3] .
The basic observation there is that a run of any algorithm A using a failure detector induces a directed acyclic graph (DAG). The DAG contains a sample of failure detector values output by D in the current run and captures causal relations between them. Each process p i maintains a local copy of the DAG, denoted by G i : p i periodically queries its failure detector module, updates G i by connecting every vertex of the DAG with the vertex containing the returned failure detector value with an edge, and broadcasts the DAG. An edge from vertex
is thus interpreted as " p i queried D for the kth time and obtained value d and after that p j queried D for the k th time and obtained value d ". Whenever p i receives a DAG G j calculated earlier by p j , p i merges G i with G j by computing the union of the vertices and edges of the two graphs and making sure that the paths in the merged graph are transitively closed. As a result, DAGs maintained by the correct processes converge to the same infinite DAG G.
Fig. 1 A DAG and a tree
The DAG G i is then used by p i to simulate a number of runs of the given consensus algorithm A for all possible inputs to the processes. For each input history H I , each path in DAG G i represents a stimulus for the schedule in the simulated run: processes take steps and observe failure-detector values in the order they appear in the path. All these runs are organized in the form of a simulation tree Υ i .
Recall that p i periodically updates G i by adding a vertex corresponding to a new query of D or merging with a DAG received from another process. Each time p i updates G i , it recomputes Υ i . Therefore, the simulation trees Υ i maintained by the correct processes converge to the same infinite simulation tree Υ . Every path in the simulation tree Υ i represents a run of A. 2 In the example depicted in Fig. 1 , a DAG (a) induces a simulation tree a portion of which is shown in (b). There are three non-trivial paths in the DAG:
. Every path through the DAG and an input history induce at least one schedule in the simulation tree. Hence, assuming an input history initially providing p 1 with input v 1 , the simulation tree has at least three leaves: and ( p 1 , v 1 , d 1 ) (p 1 λ, d 3 ) . Here S ⊥ denotes the empty schedule, and λ denotes the empty message: no non-empty message can be received in the first step of any schedule. Note that the simulation tree may contain other paths corresponding to other input histories, that is why Fig. 1b depicts only a portion of the possible tree.
The outputs produced in the simulated runs of Υ i are then used by p i to compute the current estimate of Ω. Every vertex σ of Υ i is assigned a valency tag determined as a set of decisions taken in all σ 's extensions (descendants of σ in It can be shown that every bivalent vertex in Υ has a decision gadget, i.e., finite subtree which is either a fork or a hook (Fig. 2) . Intuitively, in a decision gadget, a step of a fixed deciding process determines the univalent valency (and, thus, the decided values) in descendants S 0 and S 1 . This process (e.g., q in Fig. 2 ) must be correct. Otherwise, without its intervention, no correct process will be able to decide in any run extending S 0 or S 1 .
Therefore, by locating the same bivalent vertex in the limit tree Υ , the correct process can eventually extract the identifier of the same correct process. The vertices in each simulation tree Υ i are ordered by p i in a specific deterministic way, which guarantees that each vertex in Υ is eventually assigned the same position in the order in all local trees Υ i computed by correct processes. The identifier of the deciding process of the the "first" (according to this order) decision gadget in Υ i is then returned as the current output of Ω. This way, the correct processes eventually agree on the "first" decision gadget and, thus, on the deciding process in this gadget. Note that the time when such agreement is reached is unknown to the processes. But this is good enough for extracting Ω.
The reduction algorithm. We show that the CHT proof, originally designed for consensus, can be extended to eventual repeated consensus (i.e., to the weaker ERC abstraction). The extension is not trivial and requires carefully adjusting the notion of valency of a vertex in the simulation tree.
Lemma 1 In any environment E, if a failure detector D implements ERC in E, then Ω is weaker than D in E.
Proof Let A be any algorithm that implements ERC using a failure detector D in an environment E. As in [4] , every process p i maintains a failure detector sample stored in DAG G i and periodically uses G i to simulate a set of runs of A for all possible sequences of inputs of ERC. The simulated runs are organized by p i in the ever-growing simulation tree Υ i . A vertex of Υ i is the schedule of a finite run of A "triggered" by a path in G i in which every process starts with invoking proposeERC 1 (v) , for some v ∈ {0, 1}, takes steps using the failure detector values stipulated by the path in G i and, once proposeERC (v), for some ≥ 1, is complete, eventually invokes proposeERC +1 (v ), for some v ∈ {0, 1}. (For the record, we equip each vertex of Υ i with the path in G i used to produce it.) A vertex is connected by an edge to each one-step extension of it.
Note that in every (infinite) admissible simulated run, ERC-Termination, ERC-Integrity, ERC-Validity, and ERCAgreement are satisfied.
Since processes periodically broadcast their DAGs, the simulation tree Υ i constructed locally by a correct process p i converges to an infinite simulation tree Υ , in the sense that every finite subtree of Υ is eventually part of Υ i . The infinite simulation tree Υ , starting from the initial configuration of A and, in the limit, contains all possible schedules that can triggered by the paths DAGs G i .
Consider a vertex σ in Υ , identifying a unique finite schedule of a run of A using D in the current failure pattern F. For k > 0, we say that σ is k-enabled if k = 1 or σ contains a response from proposeERC k−1 at some process. Now we associate each vertex σ in Υ with a set of valency tags associated with each "consensus instance" k, called the k-tag of σ , as follows:
-If σ is k-enabled and has a descendant (in Υ ) in which proposeERC k returns x ∈ {0, 1}, then x is added to the k-tag of σ . -If σ is k-enabled and has a descendant in which two different values are returned by proposeERC k , then ⊥ is added to the k-tag of σ .
If σ is not k-enabled, then its k-tag is empty. If the ktag of σ is {x}, x ∈ {0, 1}, we say that σ is (k, x)-valent (k-univalent). If the k-tag is {0, 1}, then we say that σ is k-bivalent. If the k-tag of σ contains ⊥, we say that σ is k-invalid
Recall that A ensures ERC-Termination in all admissible simulated runs that extend σ . Thus, if σ is k-enabled, then the k-tag of σ is non-empty: proposeERC k must return some values in all admissible extensions of σ . Moreover, ERCTermination and ERC-Validity imply that a vertex in which no process has invoked proposeERC k yet has a descendant in which proposeERC k returns 0 and a descendant in which proposeERC k returns 1. Indeed, a run in which only v, v ∈ {0, 1} is proposed in instance k and every correct process takes enough steps must contain v as an output. Thus: Algorithm 3 Locating a bivalent vertex in Υ .
ERC-Agreement does not hold for proposeERC k σ 2 := a descendant of σ 1 in which every correct process completes proposeERC k and receives all messages sent to it in σ choose k > k and σ 3 , a descendant of σ 2 , such that k -tag of σ 3 contains {0, 1} k := k σ := σ 3 (*) For each vertex σ , there exists k ∈ N and σ , a descendant of σ , such that the k-tag of σ contains {0, 1}.
We show now that the "limit tree" Υ contains a k-bivalent vertex for some k. Consider the abstract procedure described in Algorithm 3 that intends to locate such a vertex in Υ , starting with the root of the tree.
Inductively, let σ be the currently considered k-enabled vertex such that its k-tag contains {0, 1}. Note that, initially, σ is the root of Υ , which is 1-enabled and either contains {0, 1} or is 1-invalid. Moreover, each complete iteration of the loop in Algorithm 3, starting with some k-enabled vertex σ , computes a k-enabled descendant of σ whose k -tag for some k > k contains {0, 1}.
Let the currently considered k-enabled vertex σ be not k-bivalent (if it is k-bivalent, we are done). Inductively, σ must be k-invalid, and hence it must have a descendant σ 1 in which ERC-Agreement does not hold for proposeERC k . We then locate σ 2 , a descendant of σ 1 , in which every correct process completes proposeERC k and receives every message addressed to it in the message buffer of σ . By the very way Υ is constructed, every vertex in Υ has infinitely many descendants corresponding to every correct process, so such a descendant exists. Now we use (*) to locate σ 3 , a descendant of σ 2 , such that (1) in σ 3 , two processes return different values in proposeERC k in σ 3 , (2) in σ 3 , every correct process has completed proposeERC k and has received every message sent to it in σ , and (3) the k -tag of σ 3 contains {0, 1}.
Thus, the procedure in Algorithm 3 either terminates by locating a k-bivalent tag and then we are done, or it never terminates. Suppose, by contradiction, that the procedure never terminates. Hence, we have an infinite admissible run of A in which no agreement is provided in infinitely many instances of consensus. Indeed, in the constructed path along the tree, every correct process appears infinitely many times and receives every message sent to it. This admissible run violated the ERC-Agreement property of ERC-a contradiction.
Thus, for some k, there is a k-bivalent vertex in Υ . We now can apply the arguments of [4] to extract Ω. Indeed, we can simply let every process locate the "first" such kbivalent vertex in its local tree Υ i . To establish an order on the vertices, we can associate each vertex σ of Υ with the value m such that vertex [ p i , d, m] of G is used to simulate the last step of σ (recall that we equip each vertex of Υ with the corresponding path). Then we order vertices of Υ in the order consistent with the growth of m. Since every vertex in G has only finitely many incoming edges, the sets of vertices having the same value of m are finite. Thus, we can break the ties in the m-based order using any deterministic procedure on these finite sets.
Eventually, by choosing the first k-bivalent vertex in their local trees Υ i , the correct processes will eventually stabilize on the same k-bivalent vertexσ in the limit tree Υ and apply the CHT extraction procedure to derive the same correct process based on k-tags assigned toσ 's descendants.
Thus, the correct processes will eventually locate the same k-bivalent vertex and then, as in [4] , stabilize extracting the same correct process identifier. This gives a reduction algorithm emulating Ω.
Ω is sufficient for ERC
Chandra and Toueg proved that Ω is sufficient to implement the classical version of the consensus abstraction in an environment where a majority of processes are correct [5] . In this section, we extend this result to the eventual repeated consensus abstraction for any environment.
The proposed implementation of ERC is very simple. Each process has access to an Ω failure detector module. Upon each invocation of the ERC primitive, a process broadcasts the proposed value (and the associated consensus index). Every process stores every received value. Each process p i periodically checks whether it has received a value for the current consensus instance from the process that it currently believes to be the leader. If so, p i returns this value. The correctness of this ERC implementation relies on the fact that, eventually, all correct processes trust the same leader (by the definition of Ω) and then decide (return responses) consistently on the values proposed by this process.
Lemma 2 In any environment E, ERC can be implemented using Ω.
Proof We propose such an implementation in Algorithm 4. Then, we prove that any admissible run r of the algorithm in any environment E satisfies the ERC-Termination, ERCIntegrity, ERC-Agreement, and ERC-Validity properties.
Assume that a correct process never returns from an invocation of proposeERC in r . Without loss of generality, denote by the smallest integer such that a correct process p i never returns from the invocation of proposeERC . This implies Let τ Ω be the time from which the local outputs of Ω are identical and constant for all correct processes in r . Let k be the smallest integer such that any process that invokes proposeERC k in r invokes it after τ Ω .
Let be an integer such that ≥ k. Assume that p i is a process that responds to proposeERC , for some = 1, 2, . . .. The value returned by p i was previously received from Ω i in a message of type pr omote. By construction of the protocol, Ω i sends only one message of this type and this latter contains the value proposed to Ω i , hence, the ERC-Validity property is satisfied.
Thus, Algorithm 4 indeed implements ERC in any environment using Ω.
An eventual total order broadcast algorithm
We have shown in the previous section that Ω is the weakest failure detector for the ERC abstraction (and, by Theorem 1, the ETOB abstraction) in any environment. In this section, we describe an algorithm that directly implements ETOB using Ω and which we believe is interesting in its own right.
The algorithm has three interesting properties. First, it needs only two communication steps to deliver any message when the leader does not change, whereas algorithms implementing classical TOB need at least three communication steps in this case [26] . Second, the algorithm actually implements total order broadcast if Ω outputs the same leader at all processes from the very beginning. Third, the algorithm additionally ensures the property of TOB-Causal-Order, which does not require more information about faults.
The intuition behind this algorithm is as follows. Every process that intends to ETOB-broadcast a message sends it to all other processes. Each process p i has access to an Ω failure detector module and maintains a DAG that stores the set of messages delivered so far together with their causal dependencies. As long as p i considers itself the leader (its module of Ω outputs p i ), it periodically sends to all processes a sequence of messages computed from its DAG so that the sequence respects the causal order and admits the last delivered sequence as a prefix. A process that receives a sequence of messages delivers it only if it has been sent by the current leader output by Ω. The correctness of this algorithm directly follows from the properties of Ω. Indeed, once all correct processes trust the same leader, this leader promotes its own sequence of messages, which ensures the ETOB specification.
The pseudocode of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 5. Below we present the proof of its correctness, including the proof that the algorithm additionally ensures TOB-CausalOrder.
Theorem 3 In any environment E, Algorithm A ET OB implements ETOB using Ω.
Proof First, we prove that any run r of A ET OB in any environment E satisfies the TOB-Validity, TOB-No-creation, TOB-No-duplication, and TOB-Agreement properties.
Assume that a correct process p i broadcasts a message m at time t for a given t ∈ N. We know that Ω outputs the same correct process p j to all correct processes in a finite time. As p j is correct, it receives the message update(CG i ) from p i (that contains m) in a finite time. Then, p j includes m in its causality graph (by a call to U nionCG) and in its promotion sequence (by a call to U pdate Pr omote). As p j never removes a message from its promotion sequence and is output by Ω, p i adopts the promotion sequence of p j in a finite time and this sequence contains m, which proves that A ET OB satisfies the TOB-Validity property. server processes. In order to tolerate process failures as well as partitions, forms of eventual consistency are typically considered [28, 31, 33] .
Assuming read and write operations, we can distinguish two main kinds of guarantees [2] : basic eventual consistency ensures that the effect of every write operation will eventually become visible to all replicas and ordering guarantees impose conditions on the order in which operations may be performed.
Data stores such as Amazon's Dynamo [10] or Cassandra [23] rely on basic eventual consistency alone to support a large number of read/write operations per second on a set of replicas. In their eventual consistency model, read and write operations may be performed on non-overlapping subsets of nodes. Once a write is acknowledged from a subset, the new value is asynchronously propagated to the remaining replicas. This update propagation property [3] ensures that all replicas are eventually updated. However, stale values may be observed if readers fetch data from replicas that have not yet received the ongoing updates.
Basic eventual consistency is often too weak for the users and many systems provide additional stronger guarantees on the ordering of operations. We can then distinguish session and prefix guarantees.
Session guarantees [32] preserve order of operations issued from a user in the same session, i.e., informally, a sequence of read and write operations performed during an execution of an application. Read-your-writes is a session consistency model [33] commonly used where a user after having written an object, always accesses the updated value and never sees an older value. In monotonic read consistency when a user has seen a value for an object, any subsequent accesses to the same object by that user will never return any previous values whereas monotonic write consistency serializes the writes by the same process.
Prefix guarantees define orders on the set of update operations applied to each replica. For instance, in [28] , Saito and Shapiro define eventual consistency in data stores. Assuming that the replicas start from the same initial state, they agree on the a committed prefix of operations, and this prefix should grow monotonically over time. Moreover, every submitted operation must eventually be included in the committed prefix. However, for the purpose of conflict resolution, some operation may be included in the prefix but not executed.
The committed prefix ensures that starting from the same initial state, all replicas produce the same final state. Note that the prefixes of different replicas are equivalent but not necessarily identical. For instance, two consecutive commuting operations may appear in different orders in the prefixes of two replicas, since this difference does not affect the final state.
ETOB properties ensure both the update propagation and order (session and prefix) guarantees where messages represent operations from clients to replicas. With TOB-Validity and TOB-Agreement all messages will be delivered to every correct replica thus ensuring update propagation. Session consistency models are examples of causal consistency satisfying by the TOB-Causality property of ETOB. On the other hand, our algorithm implementing ETOB ensures that after a time τ when all processes stabilize on trusting the same leader all replicas apply the same sequence of messages while the ETOB-Stability ensures the growth of this prefix after τ .
In [14] , the intuition behind eventual consistency was captured through the concept of eventual serializability. Two types of operations were defined: (1) "strict" operations need to be a stable part of a total order at the time of acknowledgement and (2) "weak" operations can be later re-ordered preserving the causal order of operations invoked by the same client. Our ETOB abstraction captures consistency with respect to the "weak" operations. (Our lower bound on the necessity of Ω naturally extends to the stronger definitions.)
Our perspective on eventual consistency is closely related to the notion of eventual linearizability discussed recently in [30] and [19] . It is shown in [30] that the weakest failure detector to boost eventually linearizable objects to linearizable ones is ♦P. We are focusing primarily on the weakest failure detector to implement eventual consistency, so their result is orthogonal to ours. In [19] , eventual linearizability is compared against linearizability in the context of implementing specific objects in a shared-memory context. It turns out that an eventually linearizable implementation of a fetchand-increment object is as hard to achieve as a linearizable one. Our ETOB construction can be seen as an eventually linearizable universal construction: given any sequential object type, ETOB provides an eventually linearizable concurrent implementation of it. Brought to the message-passing environment with a correct majority, our results complement [19] : we show that in this setting, an eventually consistent replicated service (eventually linearizable object with a sequential specification) requires exactly the same information about failures as a consistent (linearizable) one.
The notion of eventual consensus was introduced in [22] . It refers to one instance of consensus which stabilizes at the end; not multiple instances as we consider in this paper. In [12] , a self-stabilizing form of consensus was proposed: assuming a self-stabilizing implementation of S (also described in the paper) and executing a sequence of consensus instances, validity and agreement are eventually ensured. This abstraction is close to our ERC, but the authors of [22] focused on the shared-memory model and did not address the question of the weakest failure detector.
Concluding remarks
This paper defined the abstraction of eventual total order broadcast and proved its equivalence to eventual repeated consensus: two fundamental building blocks to implement a general replicated state machine that ensures eventual consistency. We proved that the weakest failure detector to implement these abstractions is Ω, in any message-passing environment. We could hence determine the gap between building a general replicated state machine that ensures consistency in a message-passing system and one that ensures only eventual consistency. In terms of information about failures, this gap is precisely captured by failure detector Σ [11] . In terms of time complexity, the gap is exactly one message delay: An operation on the strongly consistent replicated state machine must, in the worst case, incur three communication steps [26] , while one built using our eventually total order broadcast protocol completes an operation in the optimal number of two communication steps.
Our ETOB abstraction captures a form of eventual consistency implemented in multiple replicated services [6, 8, 10] . In addition to eventual consistency guarantees, such systems sometimes produce indications when a prefix of operations on the replicated service is committed, i.e., is not subject to further changes. A prefix of operations can be committed, e.g., in sufficiently long periods of synchrony, when a majority of correct processes elect the same leader and all incoming and outgoing messages of the leader to the correct majority are delivered within some fixed bound. Such indications could easily be implemented, during the stable periods, on top of ETOB. Naturally, our results imply that Ω is necessary for such systems too.
The folklore "CAP theorem" [1, 17] states that no asynchronous system can combine (C)onsistency, (A)vailability, and (P)artition-tolerance. Our result complements this claim. Indeed, it shows that replacing consistency with eventual consistency, while still providing availability and partitiontolerance, still requires the information about failures encapsulated in Ω.
